Deconstructing the detrimental effects of accompanying neoliberal logics on African citizens and environments
by Konstantin von Kleist-Retzow
1. Introduction
The number of failed states has ever increased in the past decade. Taking a look into the “Fragile State Index Annual Report 2021,” it becomes apparent that an abundance of states with an alarming or warning level of statal fragility is located in Africa.[1] While the reasons for this phenomenon are various, negative ratings in the “Fragile State Index” have serious consequences for African states. From an economic perspective, a negative rating might suggest an unattractive economic climate for foreign investors.[2] However, some economic sectors appear to be exempt from this logic. Although countries, such as the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone are categorized as highly fragile and have poor ratings regarding the economic climate, they nevertheless receive substantial amounts of foreign investment.[3] [4] This phenomenon is immensely influenced by the African countries’ abundance of natural resources. Transnational corporations (TNCs) invest large amounts of capital in these regions to extract oil at large scales in the Republic of Congo and diamonds and other resources in Sierra Leone.[5] [6] Similar processes occur all over the African continent, where natural resources are extracted and thereafter primarily exported to destinations in the Global North. This process is referred to as “extractivism” and contributes immensely to the neocolonial perpetuation of global power imbalances.[7]
Albeit international institutions like The Fund For Peace suggest a dangerous environment in many African countries and thereby disincentivize to invest in those countries, investments are undertaken and businesses are realized regularly. This phenomenon is guaranteed by Private Security Corporations (PSCs). PSCs interact with local stakeholders and safeguard extraction sites which allows TNCs to embark on extractive practices in restricted secure environments around the extraction sites. PSCs perform services that are integral to maintaining extractivism. Consequently, this work claims that PSCs safeguard neocolonial extractivist practices in Africa and thereby reproduce and intensify global power imbalances in political, economic, and social terms. Due to the limited scope of this paper, this work is going to focus mainly on PSCs in relation to the extraction of non-renewable materials, such as oil and minerals, in the African context. To that end, I am going to review existing literature on extractivism and PSCs in the African context. These findings are then connected to draw wider conclusions about the neo-colonial nature of the activities of PSCs in Africa. First, I am going to demonstrate the relevance of PSCs in contemporary security provision, with a special focus on the African context. Thereafter, I am going to explore extractivism and its consequences on African ecological, economic, social, and political landscapes. Afterwards, the role of PSCs in the context of extractivism in Africa is going to be illuminated. Finally, these findings are going to be combined to explore the geopolitical, social, and economic effects of the involvement of PSCs in extractivism in Africa. In this context, I am going to deconstruct the ideological repercussions of problematic practices of PSCs and discuss how this phenomenon shapes contemporary security provision in Africa overall.
2. The private security market and African particularities
2.1. Significance of the contemporary global private security market
The study of the private security sector underwent several changes in the past decades. While private military companies and activities of mercenaries had been the primary focus of research, PSCs and their engagement in non-military services have become prominent areas of research since the 1990s. This is due to the fact that PSCs that specialize in services such as risk analysis, surveillance, guarding, or alarm installation have become integral parts of security structures in the past decades.[8] The private security industry is a major stakeholder in security provision that outnumbers public security services with regard to employees in many countries. In the USA for instance, PSCs employ three times more personnel than police officers are employed by statal institutions.[9] This massive power in terms of personal also correlates to enormous financial resources the industry draws on. In 2017, the industry was estimated to be worth 180 billion USD.[10] For years the industry has experienced steady growth rates and is also expected to substantially grow in the future.[11] It is striking that the industry is dominated by a limited number of major corporations. The market leaders with regards to annual turnover are G4S and Securitas.[12] Before the Covid-19 pandemic, both companies’ annual turnover was greater than 10 billion USD.[13] Furthermore, G4S and Securitas rank among the most significant private employers in the world. While Securitas employs around 355.000 people, G4S employs more than 800.000 people.[14] [15] These facts make the leading PSCs highly powerful actors in the global economy.
2.2. Private Security Companies in Africa
Like on other continents, PSCs have also become increasingly prominent components of security structures in Africa. One of the market leaders, G4S, operates in 29 African countries.[16] The increasing presence of PSCs in Africa can be traced back to the perceived fragility of statal institutions which tends to correspond with increasing violence.[17] In 2017, more than 160.000 homicides occurred in Africa.[18] These statistics impact safety perceptions and cause businesses and private persons to draw on the services of PSCs. Let alone, G4S employed more than 115.000 people in Africa in 2020.[19] Additionally, G4S acquired a revenue of 400 million USD on the continent.[20] According to the company’s account, G4S, therefore, is the largest private employer in Africa.[21] However, PSCs are present to different degrees within the African countries with South Africa as the largest security market on the continent and even worldwide when comparing the security market turnover to the GDP. In many other African countries, PSCs have also become integral sectors of employment since the sector is one of the few that grows steadily.[22] In Nigeria only, 100.000 people are employed in the private security sector.[23] In the African context, PSCs are frequently hired by private persons. On average, wealthy Africans spend more than 15% of their income on security. But businesses are also highly significant customers. In Malawi for instance, 92% of businesses employ private security.[24] It becomes evident that PSCs are significant actors regardless of the political system of a country. PSCs are found in democratic as well as non-democratic states. Although PSCs provide an outstanding source of employment in Africa, employees of PSCs in Africa frequently must work under worse conditions than in other regions. Many contractors are insufficiently equipped and poorly paid. Against initial belief, employment in private security does not create welfare for many Africans.[25] Nonetheless, PSCs have become dominant actors in African economies.
3. Extractivism
3.1. Introducing extractivism
Extractivism is a concept that emerged in the 1970s. According to the economist Alberto Acosta, it refers to the removal of “large quantities of natural resources that are not processed (or processed only to a limited degree), especially for export.”[26] The extracted natural resources vary from minerals and oil, as highly prominent goods, to produce gained through extensive forestry, farming, and fishing. This practice has been exercised for 500 years and persists until today. [27] It is mainly rooted in an exploitative (neo)colonial practice of the Global North and has manifested throughout the centuries. Natural resources are extracted in formerly colonized territories, among them the African countries, and exported to the Global North. Thereby, neocolonial economic and political mechanisms are reproduced since the trade of natural resources is mainly determined by the demand in the Global North, the metropolitan center of global political and economic power structures. It is integral to this process that the primary commodities are exported to the Global North in an unprocessed condition. Once they arrive in the Global North, they are processed and integrated into production chains. These created goods are then supplied to the world market and sold in the countries where the primary commodities originated, however to a substantially higher price than the primary commodities were sold for.[28] Extractivism, therefore, is a basic element that guarantees prosperity in the Global North, to the disadvantage of most people in the Global South.
Albeit an abundance of natural resources might appear promising and offer good future economic prospects for African national economies and social systems at first glance, the effects are regularly contrary. Researchers frequently refer to this phenomenon as “the curse of plenty.”[29] Natural resources attract capital, mainly from the global north, which frequently results in extractivist practices. These have a range of negative impacts on African countries that reach far beyond the resource-extraction-industry. Environmental damage in the form of overexploitation of natural resources causes ecological degradation.[30] Furthermore, socio-economic problems intensify since TNCs commit human rights abuses and operate in affected regions regardless of societal preconditions.[31] Additionally, quick revenues from the sale of natural resources incentivize national political stakeholders to engage in corruptive practices and personal financial enrichment. Consequently, vast parts of the national economy become neglected, which ultimately causes an economic decline in countries where natural resources are extracted.[32] Meanwhile, economies in the Global North thrive through the production of goods with aid of primary commodities that originate from the Global South. The array of consequences of extractivism and their relation to the activities of PSCs are going to be explored further in section 4.2.
3.2. Extractivism in Africa
Like other regions in the Global South, the African continent is also the target of international actors in the natural resources industries. This is due to Africa’s abundance of natural resources. According to the United Nations Environment Program, Africa has 30% of the global mineral reserves, 12% of global oil reserves, and 8% of the world’s natural gas. Africa’s outstanding role in the provision of natural resources becomes significantly evident when regarding metals: 40% of the global gold reserves and 90% of chromium and platinum reserves are in Africa. Additionally, Africa is home to the world’s largest reserves of diamonds, cobalt, and uranium. Agriculturally, Africa also plays a significant role: 65% of the earth’s arable land is located on the continent.[33] Given these facts, Africa attracts enormous sums of capital from the international extractive industry. The industry is also estimated to grow. Let alone the mining industry experienced an increase in the production rate in the period from 2000 to 2019 of 28.4%.[34] These natural resources are significant for economies in the Global North. Algeria, for instance, ranks third among the largest suppliers of gas for Europe. Tunisia and Morocco provide huge amounts of phosphates for European fertilizer production. Additionally, both countries supply agricultural produce at significant scales to Europe.[35] Other countries, such as Nigeria, do not only supply markets in the Global North with oil, but also with extensive amounts of Uranium, which is crucial for electricity production from nuclear power.[36] The exploitation of African resources consequently maintains the wealth of the Global North to a significant degree.
4. Private Security Companies and extractivism in Africa
4.1. Exploring Private Security Companies in the context of extractivism in Africa
PSCs play an integral role in multiple contexts of extractivist processes in Africa. These include the involvement of PSCs in the fishing industry in the horn of Africa.[37] Additionally, PSCs are integral to the extraction of non-renewable materials, which is focused on here. There is an abundance of examples of TNCs hiring PSCs in relation to the extraction of non-renewable materials. The oil company Shell plc, for instance, has contracted G4S in Nigeria.[38] In the mining industry, PSCs are also contracted in many African states, including Madagascar and South Africa.[39] [40] Since industries that engage in extractivism are embedded into a global system, they are constituted by multiple actors with different agendas. Because most TNCs that extract and sell natural resources on the world market derive from the Global North, but a large proportion of natural resources are in Africa, these companies need to engage in unfamiliar environments. Furthermore, resources are frequently located in politically unstable countries, which makes their extraction challenging. However, securing the extraction of natural resources is the primary concern of these TNCs. Consequently, TNCs aim to create an environment that guarantees security on the extraction sites. That is why TNCs regularly hire PSCs. In these contexts, PSCs are instructed to negotiate with local partners and apply force around the extraction sites when necessary.[41] They create “physical enclaves” that guarantee resource extraction. The tasks of PSCs include erecting gated compounds surrounded by barbed wire and arranging armed escorts.[42] They push the extractive agenda regardless of the circumstances around the extraction site which mostly do not undergo improvements regarding security.
Nonetheless, PSCs do not solely act in the interest of TNCs. Moreover, PSCs are active stakeholders in the extractivist industry and pursue their interests. The engagements in the resource extracting industry are a profitable business for many PSCs. Through its security provision activities concerning non-renewable resource extraction in Africa, the market leader G4S generated a revenue of more than 160 million £ in 2011.[43] Considering that the extractive industry in Africa is estimated to grow, it can be claimed that the market is going to become even more lucrative for PSCs and that PSCs are going to try to establish private security in an ever-increasing number of countries and industries related to extractivism.
4.2. Maintaining a neocolonial system of global exploitation
PSCs are indispensable actors in the extractive industry in Africa. They mediate between the Global Northern actors and the African ‘other.’[44] Thereby, they perpetuate global power imbalances. The activities of PSCs safeguard the realization of neocolonial practices that guarantee prosperity in the Global North. Simultaneously, African countries suffer in manifold regards. First, the massive removal of natural resources which is secured by PSCs causes major ecological problems. For instance, leakages of pipelines regularly cause the contamination of ecosystems with oil, gas, and other natural resources.[45] Fish, wood, and other goods are frequently extracted at scales that inhibit the natural renewing process, which causes deforestation and overfishing.[46] North African countries for instance, such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, experience significant ecological problems due to extractivism. These include water scarcity, environmental degradation, pollution, and decreasing soil fertility. The effects of the climate crisis intensify these problems even further.[47]
Secondly, multiple socio-economic problems arise due to the involvement of PSCs in extractivism. Although establishing new oil extraction facilities and mines creates various employment opportunities in the affected areas, most of the jobs are not allocated to local citizens.[48] In Nigeria, for instance, oil corporations tend to employ skilled workers from overseas. PSCs similarly employ former officials of the military elite and pay locally employed people poorly.[49] [50] Consequently, vast shares of the local population remain unemployed and frustrated. Tensions among local citizens tend to increase since the division creates more inequality.[51]Subsequently, social problems such as crime and violence intensify.
Furthermore, by safeguarding the massive export of natural resources, PSCs perpetuate negative macro-economic repercussions. First, “Dutch disease” weakens the national economy.[52] The sale of primary commodities causes an overvaluation of the national currency, which makes domestic producers less competitive on the global market. Other sectors apart from the extractive sector become less economical and experience depression. Other sectors are generally neglected since national governments frequently primarily focus on the export of primary commodities to keep statal affairs going. However, this lack of diversification of the national economy makes the national revenue highly dependent on the prices of primary commodities on the world market.[53] For many African countries, the rents from natural resources compose a high share of the countries’ total GDP. 15 African countries derive more than 10% of their GDP from selling natural resources.[54] In Libya and the Republic of Congo, for instance, the proportion of oil rents of the GDP is higher than 43%.[55] Consequently, fluctuations in the world prices of raw materials have immediate effects on national revenue and the associated ability to provide basic public services.
Furthermore, the extracted resources are mostly directly exported, while the processing of the resources mostly occurs in the Global North.[56] A vast majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, therefore, experienced negative wealth accumulation in 2010. African countries experience deterioration in macroeconomic terms.[57] Sub-Sahara-African exports declined after 2011 and net debt increased steadily from 2011 onwards.[58] Consequently, many African states have a massive balance of trade deficits and cannot provide their populace with goods autonomously.
Lastly, the presence of PSCs in the extractivist industry ultimately has multiple detrimental effects on the national political system in African states. By cooperating with national elites, PSCs and other TNCs guarantee that the generated wealth from selling natural resources is frequently concentrated among a few of the political elite due to clientelism.[59] Through corruptive practices, public funds are frequently abused due to a lack of transparency and rules, statal institutions are weakened and government policies become poorly planned and implemented.[60] Furthermore, PSCs attain power over national governments since these are dependent on the sale of natural resources through transnational corporations.[61] Ultimately, by safeguarding extractivist practices, PSCs guarantee that national political and economic elite as well as economic actors from the Global North benefit while the populace in African countries mainly experiences negative effects in ecological, social, political, and economic terms.[62] Given the ever-expanding tendency of extractivism, PSCs uphold the ever-intensifying exploitation of African countries and the ever-increasing dominance of neoliberal logic on the continent.
5. Deconstructing underlying neoliberal logics
5.1. Legitimized actors despite violent activities
Since stakeholders with differing agendas and interests must interact during extractivist processes, powerful actors employ force and violence to assert their interests against the interests of other subordinate stakeholders, such as local communities and environmental organizations. A leading scholar in the field of extractivism, Eduardo Gudynas, stated that violence “is not a consequence of a certain type of extraction but a necessary condition for appropriating natural resources.”[63] Violence takes different shapes, ranging from statal repression to “imperial aggression by some powers committed to securing natural resources by force.”[64] The latter is the kind of violence that PSCs apply. Instructed by TNCs, PSCs interact with local actors and secure the interests of TNCs. To that end, they execute land grabs and extraction, which refers to the violent appropriation of natural resources.[65] These violent processes occur regularly in relation to extractivism and fundamentally neglect the rights of nature and human rights.[66] Without the contribution of PSCs as the intermediaries between TNCs and local actors, violent extractivism would be impossible.
Nonetheless, in the broader discourse on security PSCs established themselves as legitimated actors concerning extractivism in Africa. This phenomenon is due to the shift of focus of many PSCs towards non-military activities. While PSCs had been associated with mercenaries engaging in war, they now regularly operate in structures that are frequently viewed as legitimate since they engage in non-military, profit-seeking economic activities along the lines of dominant neoliberal norms.[67] However, the activities of PSCs guarantee the perpetuation of global economic, political, and social inequalities. Furthermore, by applying violence toward local people and environments, PSCs engage in activities that go beyond commonly legitimized structures since these entail human rights violations. Yet, PSCs remain uncontested actors in the resource extracting industry since they engage in agenda-setting that goes beyond security provision for private actors.
5.2. Renegotiating the roles of security provision
The rise of PSCs has changed the landscape of security provision in many regards. Some scholars argue that the increasing influence of PSCs causes the demise of the state as the primary provider of security. These scholars refer to the Weberian notion of the state that has a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”[68] Accordingly, the African states increasingly lose significance regarding the fulfillment of their “core function,” which is providing security as part of the social contract. African states are regarded as losing strength.[69] However, this depiction is distorted. First, Eurocentric double standards are applied when identifying African states as increasingly becoming weak since the dominance of PSCs in the Global North is not viewed as a sign of weak states.[70] Most importantly, the relation between the public and the private sphere is not as antagonistic as frequently claimed. Moreover, the public and private spheres are relative to each other regarding security provision.[71] Other scholars have even claimed that privatizing strategic resources allows political elites to increase their influence since they can weaken the influence of political contesters in these fields. Combining multiple perspectives, Abrahamsen and Williams have proposed the “global security assemblages” approach.[72] Accordingly, public and private security actors intersect and are codependent in many African countries. Their approach demonstrates that PSCs increasingly obtain power within originally publicly dominated domains, but are restricted by legal constraints.
The Nigerian petroleum industry provides an illustrating example of the blurred relationship between private and public security provision. The Nigerian state is heavily dependent on the sale of oil. 7.4% of its GDP is derived from the extraction and sale of oil in 2020, which makes oil a national interest.[73] However, in weak administrative states, such as Nigeria, technical, financial, and managerial capabilities are limited. Consequently, the Nigerian government also hired PSCs to safeguard the extraction of oil.[74] PSCs that pursue private logics do not only fulfill statal tasks but are also financed by public resources. On the other hand, the Private Guard Companies Act prohibits employees of PSCs to carry firearms in Nigeria.[75] Similar laws are found in many other African countries.[76] Therefore, PSCs cooperate with the Nigerian police since firearms are integral to security provision in politically unstable regions such as the Niger Delta, where large oil reserves are located. Using violence is indispensable when engaging in extractivism in unstable regions. These police forces are seconded to the PSCs throughout. Although they receive orders from their commanders, they are supervised by PSCs and receive supplementary wages from PSCs.[77] Additionally, governmental military forces cooperate with PSCs.[78] The intersecting dynamics between Nigerian government security forces and PSCs underscore that security provision cannot be regarded as exclusively dominated by private or public actors. Moreover, it highlights the influence of African statal institutions on PSCs, while it also allows understanding private logics that dominate public domains.
5.3. Spreading the neoliberal logic
The outstanding expansion of PSCs occurs at times when neoliberal policies are increasingly becoming prominent. Since the 1970s, the security sector underwent waves of privatization and commodification.[79]Security provision became a service that can be offered and purchased on a global market. While this phenomenon is not new, the scale at which security is now provided by private actors and not public actors and the scope of socio-political sectors that are affected is unique to this period.[80] Prior to these events, security primarily used to be a national concern which national actors were responsible for. However, international institutions started promoting the globalization of private security provision. The World Trade Organization, for instance, incorporated private security in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Thereby, member states are heavily incentivized to guarantee a competitive environment in the security industry. Additionally, the European Union has advocated for liberalizing the trade of security services. By advocating for the free trade of security services, these international institutions promoted the globalization of the neoliberal agenda, since the division between international and domestic actors and responsibilities increasingly dissolved.[81]
Although PSCs have been legally restricted in many African countries since they are not allowed to carry firearms and therefore need to collaborate with public authorities, their influence stretches beyond their legal activities by setting a neoliberal agenda within public institutions. Since African governments equally rely on the revenues generated through extractivism, PSCs influence security situations immensely. They provide know-how, expatriate personnel, and technology that significantly impact the work of public security forces. Without PSCs, national governments could not ensure security in the context of extractivism in many regards. Therefore, PSCs have indirect power over the security situation. Furthermore, PSCs, directly and indirectly, set the agendas of public security providers. Since expatriate experts of security that are employed by PSCs advocate for the interests of PSCs when interacting with public officials, PSCs can further directly promote their private interests. Additionally, given the abundance of capital in the private security industry, the services PSCs provide are frequently superior to the capabilities of many African states. Consequently, the provision of these services extends the agenda regarding security provision since PSCs reveal national actors further possibilities of security provision that would have been inconceivable without their involvement. New and more extensive forms of security provision, such as fast-response craft, make the private logics of PSCs increasingly dominant in ever more public domains.[82] Considering the violent nature of the activities of PSCs in the extractivist industry and the extending tendency of the influence PSCs, it leads to conclude that human and nature rights abuses are going to continuously occur and may even intensify. Ergo, the engagement of PSCs in the extractivist industries adequately illustrates the detrimental effect that ever more dominant neoliberal norms and practices have on many African citizens and environments.
6. Conclusion
This work has argued to recognize the substantial influence of PSCs within the resource extracting industry and the resulting negative impacts on African countries in debates on extractivism. Furthermore, this work encouraged to critically observe the private security industry regarding its perpetuation of neocolonial extractivist practices. PSCs are becoming increasingly dominant actors in Africa, especially a few significant market leaders. Since TNCs that are active in the extractivist industry in Africa frequently operate from locations in the Global North, they rely on PSCs as intermediaries that represent the interests of TNCs when interacting with local actors. PSCs provide expertise and managerial as well as technological capabilities to assess and manage the security environment in regions where natural resources are located. With aid of these services, TNCs can engage in extractivist activities even in highly unstable environments. By extensively using violence, PSCs create “physical enclaves” around extraction sites and absorb disruptions through local influences.
The engagements of PSCs frequently have a detrimental effect on African countries. Since PSCs are integral to the extractive industry, they perpetuate a neocolonial system that upholds global power imbalances. Extractivist practices do not only negatively influence local environments. Local populations also frequently suffer land grabs and other human rights violations. Crime and violence frequently intensify around extraction sites. Furthermore, political problems arise since national elites safeguard rents from the sale of natural resources through corruption. Further macro-economic repercussions cause a decline in the net wealth of most African countries. The effects of the activities of PSCs go even further; in collaboration with governmental institutions, PSCs become dominant actors regarding security provision. Thereby, they obtain influence within public institutions and attain power over the activities of public security providers, such as the police and the military. Finally, PSCs spread neoliberal norms and principles into an increasing number of economic and political sectors.
Albeit PSCs are commonly regarded as legitimated actors that pursue corporate interests in a globalized economy, their influential role should be questioned more regularly, in particular regarding their involvement in extractivism in Africa. PSCs increasingly lose legal restrictions. However, the activities of PSCs have adverse effects on people and environments. PSCs should be under an increasing array of legal restrictions that force PSCs to increasingly cooperate with public institutions. Violence around extraction sites, for instance in the form of land grabs, should not become the norm and must be prosecuted consistently. It may be concluded that the commodification of security does not improve the security situation for vast shares of the African population. The security situation solely improves for an exclusive circle of national elites and other actors with sufficient capital, such as TNCs. Contrarily, Africans who do not enjoy elitist privileges ultimately suffer from the commodification of security since PSCs safeguard extractivist practices. Although the roots of extractivism are manifold and legally restricting PSCs may not terminate extractivist practices in Africa overall, stricter legal obligations for PSCs may ensure that private neoliberal logics become less dominant in terms of security. Consequently, human rights and the rights of nature might less frequently be violated. Since extractivism operates in a globalized system, responsibilities lie with hegemonial actors from the Global North and influential national actors. Therefore, public pressure on powerful stakeholders must increase to initiate a process of critical reflection on the activities of PSCs powerful actors. Furthermore, political stakeholders must take the initiative to pursue restricting measures for PSCs in the extractivist industry in Africa. These measures are urgently needed given the destructive impact of PSCs in the extractive industry on African populations and environments.
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Notes:
[1] “Fragile States Index Annual Report 2021,” The Fund for Peace (Washington D.C., 2021), www.fundforpeace.org, 4,5.
[2] Ibid., 43.
[3] Ibid., 50.
[4] “Foreign Direct Investment – UNCTAD Handbook Of Statistics 2021,” UNCTAD, accessed March 30 2022, https://hbs.unctad.org/foreign-direct-investment/.
[5] Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, Security Beyond the State Private Security in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 149.
[6] “Oil Rents (% of GDP),” The World Bank, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?end=2019&name_desc=false&start=2019&type=shaded&view=map.
[7] Alberto Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism: Two Sides of the Same Curse Alberto,” in Beyond Development Alternative Visions from Latin America (Quito: Fondación Rosa Luxemburg, 2013), 61.
[8] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, 124.
[9] Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, “Security beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics,” International Political Sociology 3 (2009) https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511974441, 2.
[10] “The Industry Of Inequality: Why The World Is Obsessed With Private Security,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/may/12/industry-of-inequality-why-world-is-obsessed-with-private-security.
[11] Peer Schouten, “Political Topographies of Private Security in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies7 (2011) https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004209886.i-390.19, 58.
[12] Ibid., 57.
[13] “G4S Plc 2019 Preliminary Full Year Results”. 2022. G4s.Com. https://www.g4s.com/-/media/g4s/corporate/files/financial-presentations/2020/g4s-2019-full-year-preliminary-results-announcement.ashx?la=en&hash=1E5FF1367930F8D2324776D9BF20C096&hash=1E5FF1367930F8D2324776D9BF20C096.
[14] Aracruz Celulose, “Annual and Sustainability Report 2020,” 2020, http://about.puma.com/wp-content/themes/aboutPUMA_theme/financial-report/pdf/2011/PUMAGeschaeftsbericht2011_ENG.pdf.
[15] “Our Employees”. 2022. G4s.Com. https://www.g4s.com/who-we-are/our-people/our-employees.
[16] “G4S Africa,” 2012, http://w.doingbusinessguide.co.uk/media/138465/g4s_africa_fact_sheet_-_june_updated.pdf.
[17] “Fragile States Index Annual Report 2021,” The Fund for Peace, 4,5.
[18] Alexander Vazsonyi et al., “Global Study on Homicide,” Unodoc, vol. 20, 2014, https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOQC.0000037731.28786.e3, 11.
[19] Company Report, “G4S Annual Report 2020” (London, 2020), https://www.g4s.com/es-mx/-/media/g4s/corporate/files/investor-relations/2021/g4s_annual_report_2020.ashx, 94.
[20] Andy Baker, “G4S Africa G4S Africa Macro-Economic Environment,” n.d., 1–15.
[21] “G4S Africa,” 2012.
[22] Abrahamsen and Williams, “Security beyond the State,” 2.
[23] Ibid., 10.
[24] Schouten, “Political Topographies of Private Security,” 58.
[25] Ibid., 57.
[26] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 62.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 63.
[29] Ernesto Vivares, The Routledge Handbook to Global Political Economy (Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351064545, 391.
[30] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 62.
[31] Vivares, The Routledge Handbook to Global Political Economy, 393.
[32] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 65.
[33] “Our Work in Africa,” UN Environment Porgramme, 2022.
[34] C. Reichl and M. Schatz, World Mining Data 2021, 2021, https://www.world-mining-data.info/?World_Mining_Data___PDF-Files, 4.
[35] Charmaine Pereira and Dzodzi Tsikata, “Contextualising Extractivism in Africa,” Feminist Africa 2, no. 1 (2021): 17.
[36] Pereira and Tsikata, “Contextualising Extractivism in Africa,” 18.
[37] Ladan Affi et al., “Countering Piracy through Private Security in the Horn of Africa: Prospects and Pitfalls,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 5 (2016): 934–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1114882, 936.
[38] Ben Amunwa, “Dirty Work- Shell’s Security Spending in Nigeria and Beyond” (London, 2012), 6.
[39] “Mining”. 2022. G4s.Com. https://www.g4s.com/en-mg/ce-que-nous-faisons/sectors/mining.
[40] “Mining Security | Security For Mines In SA | Peaceforce Security”. 2022. Peaceforce Security. https://peaceforcesecurity.co.za/mining-security/.
[41] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, 122.
[42] Ibid., 123.
[43] Baker, “G4S Africa Macro-Economic Environment,” 14.
[44] Schouten, “Political Topographies of Private Security,” 61.
[45] Ernesto Vivares, The Routledge Handbook to Global Political Economy, 169.
[46] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 62.
[47] Pereira, Tsikata, “Contextualising Extractivism in Africa,” 17.
[48] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 68.
[49] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State , 157.
[50] Schouten, “Political Topographies,” 57.
[51] Abrahamsen and Williams, “Security beyond the State,” 9.
[52] “Dutch Disease.” Routledge Dictionary of Economics, 2013, 164.
[53] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 65.
[54] “Total Natural Resources Rents (% Of GDP) | Data,” Data.Worldbank.Org, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS?name_desc=true&view=map.
[55] “Oil Rents (% of GDP),” The World Bank.
[56] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 63.
[57] Patrick Bond, “Uneven Development and Resource Extractivism in Africa,” Routledge Handbook of Ecological Economics, 2017, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315679747-48, 407.
[58] Charles O. Manasseh et al., “External Debt and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Governance Matter?,” Plos One 17, no. 3 (2022): 1–28, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0264082, 5.
[59] Vivares, Routledge Handb. to Glob. Polit. Econ., 400.
[60] Ibid., 398.
[61] Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractism,” 67.
[62] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, 123.
[63] Vivares, The Routledge Handbook to Global Political Economy, 397.
[64] Vivares, The Routledge Handbook to Global Political Economy, 397.
[65] Ibid., 393.
[66] Ibid., 397.
[67] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, 125.
[68] Michelle Small, “Privatisation of Security and Military Functions and the Demise of the Modern Nation-State in Africa,” Accord 1, no. 2 (2006): 11.
[69] Small, “Privatisation of Security,” 12.
[70] Schouten, “Political Topographies of Private Security,” 62.
[71] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, 13.
[72] Abrahamsen and Williams, “Security beyond the State,” 3.
[73] Oil Rents (% of GDP),” The World Bank.
[74] Abrahamsen and Williams, “Security beyond the State,” 5.
[75] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, 137.
[76] Paul Hitgate and Mats Utas, Private Security in Africa – From the Global Assemblage to the Everyday, vol. 1 (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2017), 23, 145.
[77] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, 137.
[78] Ibid., 138.
[79] Abrahamsen and Williams, “Security beyond the State,” 3.
[80] Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. ‘Kayode Fayemi, Africa in Search of Security: Mercenaries and Conflicts – An Overview, Pluto Press(London: Pluto Press, 2000), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18fs91v.8, 16.
[81] Abrahamsen and Williams, “Security beyond the State,” 5.
[82] Abrahamsen and Williams, Security Beyond the State, 147.